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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF “BECAUSE” IN MECHANISTIC AND TELEOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS
IN SCIENCE

Lillian K.E. Asiala, Ph.D
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University, 2018
Dr. Katja Wiemer, Director
In science, mechanistic and teleological explanations differ in their account for why a
phenomenon occurs. A mechanistic explanation presents events within the phenomenon’s causal
history, while a teleological explanation presents the function or benefit of the phenomenon.
These explanation types present two different types of causal coherence relations; a causeconsequence relation for mechanistic explanations, and an enabling relationship for teleological
explanations. The purpose of this study was to examine the role of the causal connective
“because” in inference generation for the relations present in each explanation type. Two first
experiments show that readers accept “because” as an appropriate causal connective to convey
both cause-consequence and enabling relationships in scientific explanations, while the
mediating ideas necessary for making sense of those relations differed between them. A third
experiment used an inference verification task to evaluate to what extent reading “because”
influenced the inference of those mediating ideas online. Verification time and causal sentence
reading time were measured to evaluate whether inference generation is driven more by a fixed
schema related to the connective “because” or by the explanatory schema inherent in the context.
Verification times did not differ significantly by connective use, suggesting that inferential
processing was unaffected by the inclusion of “because”. However, a non-significant trend

revealed opposite patterns in verification times for each explanation type when “because” was
included. Results are discussed in light of the hypothesized accounts for inference generation in
both explanation types, and regarding the processing of scientific explanations generally.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Consider the question of why people get fevers when they are sick. This question could
result in one of multiple potential explanations. One explanation might present the events that
lead to the fever, such as the detection of a virus triggering the brain to raise the body’s
temperature. Another might present the benefit of the fever to the body in that it creates an
environment that is inhospitable to viruses. While these are separate accounts for why we get
fevers, they both present reasons for the phenomenon in question. One presents a mechanistic
reason, while the other presents a functional reason. How do readers make sense of these
different types of causal relations when we encounter such explanations? One way that multiple
types of causal coherence relations are made explicit in text is through the use of the causal
connective “because”. The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of causal connective
“because” in both conveying causal coherence relations for both types of explanations, and
generating the inferences required to understand each of these explanation types. This
investigation informs the way causal connective “because” contributes to inferential processing
for different causal coherence relations, and illuminates the processes that support the
comprehension of different types of scientific explanations more generally.

2
Understanding Causal Relations
The inferences that support the comprehension of causal relations have received some
attention in the cognitive literature. One approach to this investigation has focused on probing
the inferences generated when reading causal relations, such as Singer’s validation model
(Singer, Halldorson, Lear, Andrusiak, 1992; Singer, 1993). In this validation model, the
antecedent and consequent are assumed to take on the roles of a premise and conclusion
relationship that are linked by a mediating idea. In the validation model, this mediating idea is
generated by the reader as a causal bridging inference during comprehension, and this inference
is validated against background knowledge.
This model was tested in a study by Singer et al. (1992) where participants read
propositions that were causally related (“Dorothy poured water on the fire/ the fire went out”) or
temporally related (“Dorothy placed the bucket of water next to the fire/ the fire went out”). Each
item was accompanied by a question that tested the activation of the bridging inference (such as
“Does water extinguish fire?”). Participants read propositions one at a time, with a speeded
question probing the mediating idea appearing after the second proposition. Answer times were
shorter for items with a causal relation compared to a temporal one, suggesting that the
likelihood of generating the mediating idea as a causal bridging inference was greater when
reading an overt causal relation. Conversely, a causal bridging inference linking temporal
propositions was likely not generated until it was presented to the reader in the form of the
verification question. Using a similar research paradigm, Singer’s 1993 study showed that
mediating ideas were also generated as inferences for causally inconsistent items such as “Mary
threw water on the fire/ the fire grew hotter”. This supports the idea that comprehension of text
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with consistent and inconsistent causal coherence involves the verification of the causal
relation’s mediating idea.
The validation model also accounts for inferences generated when reading expository
text, such as scientific explanations. Singer and O’Connell (2003) investigated causal bridging
inferences for expository text with sentences such as “some fireworks burn red because they
contain calcium salt.” This study found that the mediating idea (“calcium salts emit red flames”)
was more likely to be produced when reading the version of the text in which the causal relation
was made explicit with the connective “because”. Without the presence of “because”, readers
were less likely to slow down to generate the necessary inference while reading the causal
sentence, and overall took longer to verify the inferred mediating idea after reading the text. This
suggests that in causal relationships outside of the narrative realm, causal inference generation
was assisted by the presence of a causal connective.
While Singer’s model has been shown to be useful for explaining the bridging inferences
that are produced by readers for straightforward cases of physical cause and effect, other types of
causal relations have been tested using this model with a somewhat different outcome.
Noordman, Vonk, and Kempff (1992) tested causal inferences in expository texts for other
causal relations such as those involving justification (e.g. “Chlorine compounds make good
propellants, because they react with almost no other substances.”). They found that the necessary
mediating ideas for these types of relations were only generated as bridging inferences as long as
they are pertinent to the task of reading, but are not generated spontaneously. When the causal
relation was relevant to the goal of reading, reading and verification times suggested that online
inference generation had taken place.
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Overall, Singer’s validation model reviewed here shows that causal inferences are
generated most frequently when reading causal relations that reflect physical cause and effect.
However, discourse conveys more types of causality than the physical causes of events. And
while the goal of scientific discourse is to describe and explain scientific phenomena (Britt,
Richter, & Rouet, 2014) the causal relations found in scientific text are not restricted to cause
and effect relations (as can be seen for example in the materials from Noordman et al., 1992
mentioned above). Causal relations – and connectives – are ubiquitous and vary along a number
of dimensions in scientific text. The purpose of this study is to investigate the nature of the
mediating ideas generated when causal connectives are encountered across two different
schemas for scientific explanations; teleological and mechanistic. These schemas present causal
relations that are not restricted to cause and effect, but encompass a wider variety of causal
relationships. Furthermore, this study investigates the role of “because” in causal inference
generation across both types of causal relations present in teleological and mechanistic
explanations. Specifically, this study distinguishes between two accounts for how “because” may
influence causal inference generation. One account for the role of “because” is that the
connective evokes a schema for a cause-consequence relationship, resulting in a causeconsequence inference. This is the type of inference necessary for understanding mechanistic
explanations, and are the inferences “because” is observed to facilitate in Singer’s validation
model (Singer & O’Connell, 2003). An alternate account suggests that “because” elicits a less
specified causal schema, and that the inference needed to understand the explanation is derived
from the explanatory context rather than the connective itself.

5
Different Forms of Scientific Explanation
Traditionally, a quality scientific explanation has been described as one in which a
phenomenon of interest can be logically gathered from events that are presented to account for it
(Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948; Trout, 2007). To lend concrete terms to the components of
explanation, the “explanandum” refers to the phenomenon to be explained, and the “explanans”
refer to an account for it. For example, in a scientific explanation for fevers, the explanandum is
the phenomenon of interest ( the fever) and the explanans would be that the body detects an
infection and signals the brain to raise the body’s temperature. Explanans according to Hemple
and Oppenheim (1948) may contain a description of the components in their states prior to the
phenomenon in question (called the “antecedent conditions”), as well as the natural laws that act
upon these components, and must have a logical path to the explanandum.
The purpose of the explanans in a prototypical explanation in science is to spell out a
mechanism. For instance, Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) assert that to answer “why” a
phenomenon occurs is to explain “how” it occurs. Referencing the prior example, the immune
system triggers fevers as a result of a chain of events that includes detection of an infection and
signaling the brain to initiate a change in temperature. In describing scientific text, Britt, Richter,
and Rouet (2014) specify the nature of explanans in scientific explanations as a series of causal
statements representing events that link a phenomenon to a process or mechanism.
Understanding causal mechanistic information is of particular importance in understanding a
phenomenon, and as a result many studies focus on the comprehension of mechanistic
information (Ahn, Kalish, Medin & Gelman, 1995; Rottman & Keil, 2011).
Mechanistic information also appears to have special status compared to other types of
information when it comes to explanation (Ahn et al., 1995). For instance, when determining
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what sort of information people seek when tasked with explaining something, Ahn et al. (1995)
found that participants seek out mechanistic information as opposed to events that tend to covary with the outcome phenomenon. People also tend to provide mechanistic over functional
explanations for why items in a categorization task possess particular features (Lombrozo, 2009).
This is consistent with Rottman and Keil’s (2011) finding that information receiving mechanistic
elaboration is judged to be more critical in understanding how a phenomenon worked. The
mechanistic explanation is ultimately conveying a sense of physical cause-consequence relations.
Its purpose is to spell out events that occur as antecedents to a final phenomenon.
However, another type of explanation is found in various scientific domains known as the
teleological explanation. Rather than a cause-consequence relationship, the teleological
explanation expresses a means-ends relationship (Tamir & Zohar, 1991), where a phenomenon is
explained with regard to enabling a benefit for a larger system. For example, a fever can be
explained teleologically by stating that a higher fever makes it difficult for an infection to
survive. These types of explanations have been valued in some scientific domains more than
others. For example, biology has been identified as a domain in which teleological explanations
have unique explanatory power (Lenox, 1983; Talanquer, 2007). In particular, there are
situations in biology where function is an appropriate response for a requested explanation
(Canfield, 1964). Canfield (1964) discusses functional analysis in biology (citing specific
examples within human anatomy and physiology) where the defining features of biological
phenomena are based on their outcome, such as explaining a heartbeat in reference to its’ role in
the circulation of blood.
Teleological explanations are pervasive in the life science classroom. Richard, Coley, and
Tanner (2017) examined teleological thinking among undergraduates and found similar
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commitments to endorsing teleological explanations across undergraduate students who were
non-majors and those entering the study of biology, with only slightly reduced commitments
from advanced students of biology. This demonstrates that teleological reasoning is pervasive
even with advanced training in the biological sciences. Tamir and Zohar (1991) also found
developmental changes in the frequency of teleological reasoning among high school biology
students. Students were presented with a sample text where an animal or plant performed a
typical behavior. Readers were asked whether the behavior would occur when an expected
beneficial outcome was removed (and then asked to explain their reasoning). They were then
presented with a scenario in which the organism performed the behavior with no resultant
benefit, and were asked to explain why the phenomenon occurred in the absence of the benefit.
The answers to each of these questions were coded for teleological reasoning, which appeared to
dwindle with more training between 10th and 12th grade.
Adults and children alike have been shown to endorse teleological reasoning about many
kinds of phenomena, although the conditions under which they will accept them shift with
development (Kelemen, 1999). For instance, Kelemen’s 1999 study found that children applied
teleological reasoning more frequently than adults (Kelemen, 1999). Lombrozo and Carey
(2006) found that for adults, the acceptance of a teleological explanation as satisfactory
specifically increased when these explanations contained information that might be useful in
predicting a future outcome (such as a desirable or beneficial end state) (Lombrozo & Carey,
2006). Taken together, teleological reasoning appears to go from a broader preference among
children to a situation-specific preference for adults.
The difference between mechanistic and teleological explanations is the notion of cause
and effect for each. While mechanistic explanations convey a cause and effect relationship, the
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teleological explanation presents a benefit enabled by the phenomenon in the position of the
explanans. This is a means-ends relationship in which the end state accounts for the
phenomenon. There is evidence to suggest that teleological explanations are not misunderstood
as causal, but constitute their own category of explanation altogether. Zemla, Steiner, and
Sloman (2016) found that individual differences in causal reasoning did not affect endorsement
of teleological explanations. They initially predicted that willingness to accept a teleological
explanation was based on the reader’s sensitivity to causal direction, where less sensitivity to
causal direction would reduce the chance of noticing that the teleological explanation does not
present a cause-consequence relationship. Zemla et al. (2016) evaluated each participants’ bias
toward causal reasoning in addition to testing their endorsement of teleological explanations. The
findings suggested that sensitivity to causal directionality was not related to endorsement of
teleological explanations. However, despite the fact that people seem to be aware that
teleological explanations are not presenting the cause-consequence relationships of mechanistic
explanations, causal language is still used to articulate teleological explanations. In the next
section I will review different forms of causality and how they are expressed in expository text.
Coherence Relations
The meaning of text is more than the sum of its parts. Readers comprehend the meaning
of separate propositions and infer relationships between them (Kehler, 2002), so that the final
representation is greater than the individual propositions (Asher & Lascarides, 2003). In
explanations there are two components of text for which coherence must be established in order
to understand them (Sanders, Spooren, & Noordman, 1992). Coherence may be derived from
argument overlap (when the text references the same entities) (Graesser, McNamara, Louwerse,
& Cai, 2004), or it may stem from the relations inferred between discrete propositions of text
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(Sanders et al., 1992). Hobbs (1979) and others refer to these relationships among text segments
as “coherence relations”, and Hobbs illustrates their importance in the example sentences “John
took the train to Istanbul. He likes spinach.” Although “he” clearly refers to “John” in these text
segments, the reader also needs to infer that the connection between liking spinach and traveling
to Istanbul is causal (Hobbs, 1979).
Of particular importance to explanations are causal coherence relations. Research in
discourse processes has classified coherence relations by their function, and causal relations
make up a prominent subclass of these relations. Mann and Thompson (1986) identified several
schemas of causal relations including cause, evidence, justification, and reason in their
“Rhetorical Structure Theory” (RST). Sanders, Spooren, and Noordman (1992) built upon RST
to establish characteristics of a taxonomy of coherence relations, decomposing the relational
propositions into combinations of four cognitive primitives: causality, order, polarity, and source
of coherence. In combining these four characteristics, Sanders et al. (1992) generated a
taxonomy with twelve prototypical relations, eight of which represented categories of causal
relations. To illustrate this diversity in causal coherence relations, Table 1 presents each causal
relation identified by the taxonomy, defined by each of the primitives (Sanders et al., 1992).
Of the coherence relations defined by Sanders et al. (1992) in their taxonomy, causal
relations are most distinct. The causality primitive refers to whether two text segments represent
an antecedent and consequent. If they do, the relation is causal. If they do not, the relation is
additive. Causal relations are more distinctive than additive relations because they can differ on
the second cognitive primitive of “order” which refers to whether the text segments are “basic”
(cause, consequence) or “non-basic” (consequence, cause) (Sanders et al., 1992). Of the
coherence relations identified (Sanders et al., 1992), the number of causal relations is twice the
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number of additive relations, because each causal combination can have a basic and non-basic
order.
Another primitive that distinguishes causal coherence relations is a relation’s source of
coherence (Sanders et al., 1992). This characteristic encompasses the communicative intent of
the speaker, where the relation between sentences can be understood by the speaker’s purpose. A
semantic reading relates two text segments at face value. A pragmatic reading factors in the
speaker’s intent. In the sentence “The stove is on because I can see the water steaming”, a purely
semantic reading places the observation of steaming water as the antecedent to the stove being
on, which is not logically possible. However, in a pragmatic reading, the observation of the water
steaming is evidence that justifies the conclusion that the stove is on. In other words, the purpose
for stating the observation is to justify the conclusion that the stove is on, rather than to provide a
cause for the stove being on.
Source of coherence is particularly relevant to the domain of explanation, because
explanation is an activity done with communicative pragmatic intent (Keil, 2006; Wilson & Keil,
1998). This is not to say that the relations found in explanations are all to be understood
pragmatically. For instance, a semantic relation that clarifies cause and effect is essential for
mechanistic explanations. However, both forms of explanation- mechanistic and teleologicalshow that relations found in scientific domains are not restricted to the cause-consequence.
Teleological explanations are function-based. The enabling relation found for teleological
explanations is not included in the Sanders’ et al. taxonomy (1992). A close relative of this
enabling relation, however, is the goal-instrument relation (see Table 1), which is characterized
by a goal-based pragmatic causal relation that involves the justification of an action or use of a
tool to enable a final result. The biggest difference between a goal-instrument and enabling
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relations is goal status. There is no explicit assumption of goal-based action in teleological
explanations (thought people may peripherally assume a goal when reading them). Another close
relation is the consequence-condition relation, where a state enables an outcome as long as the
conditions of a qualifier are met. Sanders et al. (1992) provide the example that drinking wine
can be healthful and lengthen life if drank in small quantities infrequently. In this example, the
action (drinking wine moderately) enables the lengthening of one’s life assuming the condition
of moderate consumption. This relation differs from the enabling relations of teleological
explanations in the condition necessary for enabling the benefit. Teleological explanations do not
place any qualifiers on the outcome or the benefit. While both of these relations are closer to the
enabling relation found in teleological explanations, neither of them captures the causal relation
present in teleological explanations.
Several kinds of causality expressed in discourse through a combination of the cognitive
primitives identified by Sanders et al. (1992) are documented in psychological research. McCabe
and Peterson (1988) identify and record physical, logical, and psychological forms of causality
expressed in naturalistic causal language. Trabasso, van den Broek & Suh (1989) classify
different types of causality in a narrative text analysis. Using a counterfactual test, Trabasso et al.
(1989) identify physical cause – such as when A is sufficient for B to occur, but also enabling
relations in which A facilitates B, but B does not necessarily occur. They also document
motivational cause (when the antecedent contains goal information) and psychological cause
(when the consequent is an emotion or cognition). This research, in addition to the taxonomic
work regarding coherence relations, characterizes the breadth of linguistic representations for
these causal relations that occur in the physical world, and rhetorically in discourse.
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Table 1
Causal Relations defined by Cognitive Primitives from Sanders et al. (1992)
Source of Coherence

Order

Polarity

Relation

Semantic

Basic

Positive

Cause-consequence

Semantic

Basic

Negative

Contrastive-consequence

Semantic

Nonbasic

Positive

Consequence-cause

Semantic

Nonbasic

Negative

Contrastive consequence-cause

Pragmatic

Basic

Positive

Argument-claim
Instrument-goal
Condition-consequence

Pragmatic

Basic

Negative

Contrastive claim-argument

Pragmatic

Nonbasic

Positive

Claim-argument
Goal-instrument
Consequence-condition

Pragmatic

Nonbasic

Negative

Contrastive claim-argument
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In summary, causal relations vary along multiple dimensions. Semantic source of
coherence represents relations that describe the physical causality found in mechanistic
explanations. Other types of causal relations have a pragmatic source of coherence, in which the
text segments are related through the speaker’s intent (Sanders et al., 1992), as is the case when
justifying conclusions, or explaining psychological events (Traxler, Sanford, Aked, & Moxey,
1997). In the next section, we will discuss the ways these forms of causality appear in text. As
will be discussed, different forms of causality found in discourse do not always have specific
language to distinguish them.
Connectives
While coherence relations are often independently inferred by the reader, connectives
may facilitate and constrain interpretations of coherence relations in text (Caron, Micko, &
Thuring, 1988; Mulder & Sanders, 2012). An example of the possible constraints connectives
place on detecting coherence relations is demonstrated in a study by Mulder and Sanders (2012),
which investigated the relation encoded when readers encountered connectives. In their study,
participants read sentences linked by connectives, and then took a recognition test with repeat
items or new sentences where the connective was changed. New connectives either preserved the
original coherence relation, or presented a different relation. Participants were more likely to
falsely recognize a new sentence if the change to the connective preserved the original coherence
relation. This suggests that readers did not remember the specific connective, but rather the
relation it directed them to generate between propositions in the sentence (Mulder & Sanders,
2012). Readers were more frequently correct in their rejection of new sentences when the
connective meaningfully altered the relation in the sentence.
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Furthermore, connectives facilitated the activation of certain coherence relations in a
study by Caron, Micko and Thuring (1988). In this study, participants were instructed to
memorize sentences that lacked a clear relationship between the text segments and were joined
by “because”, “and”, or no connective at all. Participants were given varied times to study these
sentences, and then performed a cued recall task in which the first text segment was presented as
a cue for the second segment. With sufficient reading time, participants had superior memory for
propositions linked by “because”. A model of elaborative processing suggests that “because”
lead the reader to generate additional details that supported a coherent causal relationship. This
interpretation is consistent with the types of errors from the recall task. Readers mistakenly
recalled causal elaborations. In other words, causal connectives led to a higher frequency of
misremembering ideas that were generated to make sense of a causal relation, rather than the
somewhat unrelated segment itself (Caron et al., 1988).
The way that connectives influence processing has been investigated by Millis and Just
(1994) in the “Connective Integration Model”, where encountering a connective alerts the reader
to the need to integrate an upcoming proposition with the prior text. At the time of integration,
the interpretation of both text segments is modified with inferences to be consistent with the
meaning of the connective. This model proposes that connectives reduce the cognitive resources
necessary for comprehending a coherence relation, and advances the hypothesis that integration
occurs during or after the construction of the representation of the second clause. To test this,
Millis and Just (1994) measured the verification time of a probe word from either the first or
second text segment after reading a sentence that was linked by “because” or presented as
separate propositions. This verification task tested the activation level of the first proposition
after finishing the second. As predicted, probes for the first proposition were verified faster for
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sentences containing “because”. This suggests an increased availability of the first text segment
upon encountering “because”, supporting the connective integration model.
While this literature demonstrates the power that connectives have in guiding,
facilitating, and constraining the interpretation of coherence relations in text, connectives are not
magic bullets for perceiving relations, nor are relations veiled without them. Myers, Shinjo and
Duffy (1987) found that regardless of the presence of a connective, two propositions are more
easily remembered when they are moderately related (compared to unrelated or highly related).
In fact, connectives are probably best understood as facilitators that act on a spectrum of being
minimally useful because the connection is obvious, to facilitating inferences and elaboration
(Caron et al., 1988; Millis & Just, 1994) to driving the inference itself (Singer et al., 1992; Singer
1993), to distracting readers with an ill-fitting connection and slowing comprehension (Millis &
Just, 1994). Millis and Just’s (1994) third experiment illustrates this spectrum in their finding
that causal connectives were more effective in facilitating integration of propositions that were
moderately causally related than of propositions that were not at all causally related.
Coherence relations and connectives are not entirely redundant. One coherence relation
can be represented by multiple connectives, and one connective may indicate different coherence
relations in context. An illustration of this is in the way coherence relations are conveyed by
connectives across different languages. Caron (1997) provides the example of causal connectives
in French, where “parce que” and “puisque” indicate causal coherence relations, but differ in the
speaker’s attitude toward the causal relation. “Parce que” best translates to “because” in English,
and signals an argumentative cause (in Sanders’ taxonomy, this would be a pragmatic causal
relation). Another French connective “puisque” translates to “since” in English, and refers to an
observable cause, which is a semantic relation according to the source of coherence primitive
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(Sanders et al., 1992). This can be contrasted with a connective such as “and”, which could be
additive, but it may also convey a temporal shift or a causal relation in some contexts (Caron,
1997).
Similar to French, Dutch also has two terms for “because”, namely “want” and “omdat”.
Pit (2006) investigated how these Dutch connectives differ in the way they are distributed in
natural language using a corpus analysis of newspaper and narrative text. The analysis used a
number of markers of subjectivity for the relation, such as the extent to which the speaker
expressed themselves in the utterance, or presented a perspective of a third person. “Want” was
found to be used more frequently for subjective relations compared with the use of “omdat” (Pit,
2006). Additionally, Maat and Degand (2003) contrasted various Dutch and French casual
connectives on a scale of speaker involvement using a corpus analysis. Speaker involvement in a
semantic cause-effect relation is minimal, but increases for a relation that may express
psychological causality (such as coming to a conclusion based on some observed information).
Dutch “want” was classified as higher on the speaker involvement scale than sentences featuring
“omdat”. Furthermore, French “puisque” sentences were higher on a scale of speaker
involvement than those including the French causal connective “car”, although both translate to
mean “because” in English (Degand & Maat, 2003).
In English, the causal connective “because” is more universally used over a spectrum of
speaker involvement. For instance, connectives like “because” and “so” are frequently used for
expressing physical cause as well as psychological cause and reasoning. In fact, it is even
common for adult speakers to use “because” to convey information about enabling relations as
well as inversions of cause and effect (McCabe & Peterson, 1988). Thus, “because” serves the
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function that several backward causal connectives take on in other languages. It is used across
relations on a number of primitives identified by the taxonomy of Sanders et al. (1992).
Millis, Golding, and Barker (1995) found that “because” facilitated inference generation
during reading of narratives. In their study, participants made lexical decision judgments on
inference-related words. Participants read segments linked with a “because” or as separate
sentences one word at a time, such as “Sherry quickly mopped up the soup on the wooden floor.
A waiter accidently tripped on the step by the kitchen.” This was followed by a lexical decision
task for words that were not mentioned in the sentence, but were a part of the causal connection
in the sentence (such as “spill”). Millis et al. (1995) found that responses to these inferencerelated words were faster than an unrelated word when the text was linked by “because”, as
opposed to when the sentences were presented separately.
Singer’s studies on the validation of causal inferences also demonstrated that the
inclusion of “because” was important for generating causal bridging inferences scientific text
(2003). These texts expressed physical cause-consequence relationships such as “some fireworks
burn red because they contain calcium salt”. To test whether this mediating idea was generated
or not, participants would receive a timed question reflecting the idea at the end of the text.
Slower reading times for the sentence containing the causal relation coupled with faster
responses to the mediating idea provided evidence that the bridging inference had been
constructed while reading the sentence.
Texts were presented either in an explicit version, where this mediating idea was
presented in the text, or as an implicit version that left this information out. This mediating idea
was tested in a verification question after reading the text. The inclusion of “because” was also
varied across causal sentences between both implicit and explicit versions. When participants
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read implicit texts that included “because” in the causal sentence, reading time was longer for the
causal sentence, but had similar question verification times for the mediating idea for the version
of the text that had explicitly mentioned the mediating idea. However, when the causal sentence
was divided into separate sentences, verification time took longer for the implicit text. This
suggests that readers were inferring the mediating idea when reading the implicit version when
the causal sentence contained “because”. When the causal sentence of the implicit version was
not linked by “because”, the verification times suggest that the inference wasn’t computed until
the time of verification. Ultimately, the science texts only followed the pattern of reading times
consistent with the validation of causal bridging inferences in the cases where the causal relation
was made clear through the inclusion of causal connective “because”.
Up to this point, the inferences that have been explored by the literature cited here are
those that occur for semantic cause-consequence relations. However, the validation model has
also been applied to multiple types of causal relations that can occur in expository text. For
instance, different causal relations were present in materials submitted to the validation model in
a study conducted by Singer, Harkness, and Stewart (1997). Their study tested the validation of
causal bridging inferences across two sets of materials. One set was taken from Noordman and
Vonk (1992), who had previously failed to find evidence for the validation of causal bridging
inferences with their materials. The other were constructed by Singer et al. (1997). Although
they do not discuss this in their publication, Singer’s materials more frequently represented
scientific cause-consequence relations such as “some fireworks burn red because they contain
calcium salt”, while the materials from Noordman and Vonk (1992) frequently featured
justifications based on scientific facts such as “silicon tiles were used for the space shuttle
because the total weight had to be kept low”. The inference that silicon is light may be inferred

19
from this justification relation, but that inference is different than the inference required to
understand that calcium salt burns red.
Singer et al. (1997) used both sets of materials in the verification paradigm outlined
earlier, in which the reading time of the target sentence containing the causal relation was
measured, as well as the time taken to verify the mediating idea. Looking at verification times for
the mediating inference across both sets of materials reflected longer verification times for
mediating ideas in Noordman’s et al. (1992) texts compared to Singer’s texts. Explicit
knowledge of the properties of silicon presented in the text assisted the processing of the
verification question, but this did not appear to occur spontaneously for the implicit text versions,
even though the reading time for the causal sentence was longer. This may have been because
the mediating idea for justification relations required different information than the mediating
idea necessary for semantic cause-consequence relations. Items expressing justification
relationships may have failed to demonstrate the same pattern in reading and verification times
as the materials with straightforward cause-consequence relations, because the verification
question may not have sufficiently probed the mediating idea generated for that relation.
The causal connective “because” is used naturalistically in language for many types of
relationships (McCabe & Peterson, 1998). These different uses map onto different types of
causal relations, including those that characterize the two explanation forms described at the
outset of this proposal. Mechanistic explanations present a cause-consequence relation. Singer’s
validation model found that readers encountering cause-consequence relations in both narrative
and expository text generated causal bridging inferences when reading these relations (Singer,
1993; Singer & O’Connell, 2003). However, teleological explanations convey an enabling
relationship, where the phenomenon enables a beneficial state. With this difference in causal
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relations, the mediating ideas logically connecting text segments also differ. The specific
inferences associated with the teleological schema for explanations have not yet been
investigated. One focus of this study is to examine and compare the mediating ideas associated
with causal relations for teleological and mechanistic explanation schemas in science.
While the current literature has not contrasted the mediating inferences associated with
these specific explanatory schemas, there is some research on cause-consequence relations, the
order of which has been reversed. This is somewhat similar to the temporal order of events
presented in a teleological explanation, with the beneficial state presented as the reason for the
phenomenon in question. Traxler et al. (1997) compared two types of causal relations by
examining differences between causal and diagnostic relations linked with “because”. Causal
relations with a basic order (cause-consequence) such as “the streets are wet because it is
raining” had a natural advantage in processing time over non-basic relations like “it is raining
because the streets are wet”. However, reading time for non-basic order was reduced when the
diagnostic direction was established as an instance of psychological causality, such as “I think it
is raining because the streets are wet”.
Traxler et al. (1997) describe “simple cause” and “diagnostic cause” as “two superficial
uses of because”. These are somewhat analogous to mechanistic and teleological explanations,
the difference being that in the teleological explanation, a final cause or goal state accounts for
the phenomenon, whereas in Traxler’s et al. study, the diagnostic relation is more of an evidencebased relation that is establishing psychological causality without trying to account for the
phenomenon’s cause. Traxler et al. (1997) claimed that “because” in every context activates the
same schema, and that diagnostic relations take more time to interpret because they require
modification to fit a cause-consequence relation. Diagnostic statements require additional
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information (such phrases like “I think”) to modify the diagnostic relation to a causal one by
establishing psychological causality.
Once different causal schemas are established, however, it is possible that “because”
directs the reader to link propositions specific to that schema so that the causal relation is
understood. If so, the reader would produce a different bridging inference for a justification or
enabling relation than they may generate for the cause-consequence relation used in Singer’s
validation model (1992). The teleological explanatory schema presents an enabling relation with
a reverse temporal order (the final cause is placed in the position of the antecedent). Yet they are
expressed using causal connectives. The findings of Zemla et al. (2016) suggest separate
schemas for teleological and mechanistic explanations in the lack of a statistical relationship
between sensitivity to causal direction and endorsement of teleological accounts. If “because”
initially primes a cause-consequence schema (as Traxler et al., 1997 suggest), the processing of a
teleological explanation with that cause-consequence schema should result in conflicts in the
validation of the bridging inference. If not, “because” elicits a general causal schema, and the
specific explanatory schema may cue the generation of an inference tailored to the appropriate
causal relation. The current study will examine which of these accounts is more likely.

CHAPTER 2
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS

As was reviewed in the literature outlined for this study, discourse can convey a variety
of different types of causal relations. These relations may be up to the reader to detect, or they
may be made more apparent by the presence of a causal connective. However, connectives are
not always specific to the precise nature of the relation they signal. For example, the causal
connective “because” may indicate a cause and effect relationship, or it may be used to indicate a
diagnostic relationship (Traxler et al., 1997). If the same causal connective can be used to
indicate more than one type of causal relations, how does the connective contribute to
understanding the coherence relation at hand? The current study tests two potential accounts for
how “because” influences causal inference generation in the context of two types of scientific
explanations. Specifically, the study investigates whether inference generation is directed by the
specific lexical meaning of “because”, or directed by the schema associated with the type of
scientific explanation. These accounts were compared by measuring the explicit acceptance of
“because” in both mechanistic and teleological explanations, and investigating whether causal
inference generation was differentially impacted by the presence of “because” in both
explanation types.
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The acceptance of “because” for both explanation types, in combination with the
systematic selection of “so that” for teleological explanations, supports the proposed account of
“because” conveying different causal relationships in each explanatory schema. One of the
assumptions of the research question posed for this study is that both mechanistic and
teleological explanations contain causal relations. In order to rest on that assumption, the first
experiment establishes whether readers explicitly perceive causal coherence relations in both
explanation types. Next, the selection of “because” is compared with the selection of a more
specific enabling connective “so that” for both explanation types to test whether participants
recognize different causal relations for mechanistic and teleological explanations.
Furthermore, a goal of this study is to investigate systematic differences in the mediating
ideas necessary for understanding causal relations in both types of explanations, and determine
whether “because” triggers the inference of mediating ideas in both contexts. In the offline task,
readers are asked to identify an idea from a selection of propositions that must be true in order
for the causal relation to make sense. Furthermore, a verification task tests the extent to which
these mediating ideas are facilitated by “because” during reading. This assesses whether the
primary schema guiding causal inference generation is elicited by the connective “because”, or
by explanatory context after “because” has signaled a more general causal relationship. Each of
the proposed accounts for the influence of “because” on causal inference generation results in a
distinct prediction for the inferential processes that occur when reading “because” in mechanistic
versus teleological explanations, referred to as causal dominance and explanatory dominance
hypothesis from here on out.
In a causal dominance account, reading “because” activates a “cause-consequence”
schema. When the cause-consequence schema is activated, it guides the generation of a specific
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inference consistent with the mediating ideas necessary for cause-consequence relations. If
“because” elicits this cause-consequence schema and subsequent inference, this will facilitate the
processing of mechanistic explanations that require this sort of inference to be coherent. Reading
time for mechanistic explanations would be prolonged to permit inference generation, while the
time it takes to verify that inference after reading the text would be faster, compared to an
explanation without “because” to provide an early cue for this schema. However, the activation
of the cause-consequence schema would disrupt the processing of explanations that require a
different kind of inference, such as the teleological explanation. In the teleological explanation,
the cause-consequence schema would guide an inference that interferes with the one necessary
for understanding the enabling relationship. In that case, at the time of verification, a different
schema for enabling relations must be activated to guide the generation of an inference for
understanding the enabling relationship. The initial presence of a conflicting inference would
result in longer reading times for the explanations, and the activation of a more appropriate
schema and new inference appropriate for enabling relations would prolong verification times for
mediating ideas for the teleological explanations.
An alternative to this model is the explanatory dominance account, in which “because”
merely marks the presence of some unspecified causal relationship to be constructed by the
reader using information from the context. In this view, the inferential processes are driven by
the explanatory context itself, rather than a fixed causal schema activated by the connective
“because”. In this model, the explanatory context activates a specific causal coherence relation,
and the reader generates the specific inferences consistent with that coherence relation. The
meaning of the connective would then be interpreted consistent with the explanation schema. In
this model for inferential processing, reading “because” activates an unspecified causal schema.
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Through reading the remaining text, the context triggers a more specific schema for the causal
relation at hand, and this guides the required inference for coherence. This translates to longer
reading times for explanations containing “because” to permit inference generation, but the
initial generation of the inference that is consistent with the explanatory context would result in
shorter verification times for causal coherence relations in both mechanistic and teleological
explanations. This is because there is no interference from a conflicting causal schema when
reading “because” for enabling relations in teleological explanations.
The central difference between these models is whether the connective or the explanation
itself drives the relevant schema for causal inference generation. In the causal dominance model,
“because” elicits a cause-consequence schema that disrupts necessary inference generation for
understanding enabling relations in teleological explanation. In the explanatory dominance
model, “because” elicits a general causal schema and inference generation is guided by the
specific causal relation that the reader gets from the context, thereby facilitating similar
processing in both types of relations. These accounts are compared by measuring the reading
time of the causal sentences with “because” or separated by a full stop, and the speed of
verification for mediating ideas, in both explanation types. The combination of these measures
will indicate for which explanations “because” facilitates causal inferences, thereby
distinguishing between these two accounts.

CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 1A

An initial study was conducted on the materials proposed for use in the experiments
outlined in this proposal. The purpose of this study was to assess participants’ acceptance of
causal connective “because” across mechanistic and teleological explanations for a variety of
biology topics (see Appendix A for teleological and mechanistic explanations for these topics).
Method
Participants
Sixty-two undergraduate students participated in study 1A for course credit in an
introductory psychology course. Ages ranged from 18-27 years with an average of 19 years of
age. Thirty-five participants were female, and 27 were male. The majority of students reported
English as their most frequently used language, though four students reported other languages
(Chinese, Japanese, and ASL) as most frequently spoken.
Materials
Mechanistic and teleological explanations one sentence in length were constructed for 16
topics ranging from anatomy and physiology to animal behavior (see Appendix A). Presentation
of the explanation as mechanistic or teleological was counterbalanced across two versions of the
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experiment. Each of the explanations had a blank space between the phenomenon of interest and
the account for the phenomenon. Participants were instructed to fill in the space with the
connective they felt best represented the relationship between text segments, and were given a
selection between additive connective “and”, adversative connective “but” and causal connective
“because”. In addition, 20 filler items represented additive and adversative relations so that all
three connective options were sensible choices at some point during the task. Filler and critical
items were presented to participants in random order. Participants also answered demographic
questions about their first spoken language, most frequent language, age, and gender.
Procedure
This study was conducted on computers in a lab setting. After giving consent,
participants were provided a link to a Qualtrics survey that presented the instructions for the task.
The experimenter read the instructions aloud and was available throughout the procedure to
answer any questions. Participants were informed that they would be reading a number of
sentences about biology with blank spaces in them, and that their task was to make a decision
about the word that fit best in the sentence. The available connectives were selected by the
participant using a dropdown menu with the available options “and”, “but”, and “because”.
Participants were instructed to select the best fitting word for the sentence, even in cases where
multiple words could make sense. After the task was finished, participants answered the
demographic questions.
Results and Discussion
The proportions of the selection of each connective was calculated for mechanistic and
teleological items for each participant. Paired samples t-tests were conducted to compare the
proportion of “because” selection to the proportion of “and” and “but” selection separately for
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mechanistic and teleological explanations. For mechanistic explanations, participants were more
likely to select “because” than “and”, t(61)=12.22, p<0.01, 95% CI [0.39, 0.54] and more
frequently than “but”, t(61)=20.73, p<0.01, 95% CI [0.56, 0.69]. A preference for “because” was
also established for teleological explanations, where the selection of “because” was greater than
the selection of “and”, t(61)=5.92, p<0.01, 95% CI [0.19, 0.37] and “but”, t(61)=11.86, p<0.01,
95% CI [0.36, 0.51]. Furthermore, an independent samples t-test compared the proportion of
“because” selected for both types of filler sentences against a test value of 0.33; a value
representing chance selection among three options. The selection of “because” for additive filler
sentences was significantly smaller (M=0.23, SD=0.14) than the 0.33 test value, t(61)=-9.39,
p<0.01, 95% CI [-0.18, -0.12]. The selection of “because” was also significantly smaller
(M=0.18, SD=0.16) than the 0.33 test value, t(61)=-5.27, p<0.01, 95% CI [-0.13, -0.06] for
adversative filler sentences. Overall, the average selection of “because” was higher for
mechanistic items (M=0.70, SD=0.17) than teleological items (M=0.57, SD= 0.20) t(61)=4.0,
p<0.01, 95% CI [0.03, 0.06]. However, the more frequent selection of “because” over “and” and
“but” in both mechanistic and teleological explanations (but not for filler sentences) suggests that
the dominant relation perceived for both explanation schemas is causal, and that “because” is an
accepted connective in both.
Table 2
Selections of Connectives for Mechanistic and Teleological Explanations
“Because”

“And”

“But”

Explanation

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Mechanistic

0.70

0.17

0.23

0.15

0.07

0.11

Teleological

0.57

0.20

0.29

0.19

0.14

0.14

CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 1B

Study 1A found that readers identified causal relationships across teleological and
mechanistic explanations, by accepting “because” as an appropriate connective for them. The
purpose of study 1B was to investigate whether readers are sensitive to the different types of
causal relationships that underlie mechanistic and teleological explanations, respectively. It was
hypothesized that participants would select different causal connectives to represent the causal
relations in mechanistic and teleological explanations. Specifically, participants were anticipated
to connect the propositions of a mechanistic relation with a connective that conveys a causeconsequence relationship (“because”), but that they would connect the propositions of a
teleological explanation with a connective that fills an enabling relationship (“so that”).

Method
Participants
Sixty participants were recruited through SONA, an online platform made available to all
students enrolled in an introductory psychology course (Psych 102). The study was described as
a task that would involve reading about scientific phenomena. Participants ranged in age from
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18-23, 33 were female and 27 were male. Participation was compensated with course credit. The
majority of students reported English as their most frequently used language, though one student
reported Nepali as most frequently spoken.
Materials
This study presented participants with the same sentence-long scientific explanations
used in study 1A, one at a time. Each explanation was presented in two versions for the
participant to choose between, one written with “because” and the other with “so that”.
Mechanistic and teleological versions of all 16 topics were counterbalanced across two versions
of the experiment (see Table 3 for example). After the task was finished, participants answered
the same demographic questions from study 1A.

Table 3
Mechanistic and Functional Explanations Worded with “Because” and “So That”

Mechanistic

Teleological

“Because”

“So That”

Skin becomes tan because when it
is in the sun, the rays activate
special cells that produce a deep
brown pigment called melanin.

Skin becomes tan so that when it
is in the sun, the rays activate
special cells that produce a deep
brown pigment called melanin.

Skin becomes tan because it can
be protected from damage that
comes from certain types of rays
from the sun, such as cancercausing UV rays.

Skin becomes tan so that it can be
protected from damage that comes
from certain types of rays from the
sun, such as cancer-causing UV
rays.
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Procedure
Upon providing consent, participants received the link to the Qualtrics survey. The first
page described the instructions for the task. The experimenter read these instructions aloud as
participants followed along. Participants were informed that each item would be presented as two
sentences, and were instructed to select the sentence they felt was more appropriately worded. In
the event that both versions of the sentence seemed plausible, participants were instructed to
select the version they felt was best. Items were presented one at a time on the screen in a
randomized order. Once the task was finished, participants answered the demographic questions.
Results and Discussion
A 2 X 2 chi square analysis tested whether selection frequency of sentences with “so
that” versus “because” depended on the type of explanatory schema (teleological vs.
mechanistic). Connective choice significantly depended on the explanatory schema, c (1, 955) =
2

261.54, p<0.05. As hypothesized, sentences phrased with “because” were more frequently
selected for mechanistic explanations and “so that” was selected more frequently for teleological
explanations (see Table 4). This suggests that participants considered “so that” more appropriate
for teleological explanations, and “because” more acceptable for mechanistic explanations.
However, the counts for both connective options for each explanation type also revealed that
participants selected the “because” wording for the sentence at a higher frequency in the
teleological explanations than selected “so that” wording in the mechanistic explanations. This
suggests that the two connective phrases may be considered interchangeable to a greater degree
in a teleological context. Overall, the results of experiment 1A and 1B demonstrated that readers
accept “because” as an appropriate connective for conveying both types of causal relations in
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mechanistic and teleological explanations, but specify the enabling nature of the relation in the
teleological explanation in the selection of “so that”.

Table 4
Frequency of “Because” and “So That” Selected for Mechanistic and Teleological Explanations
Explanation

“Because”

“So That”

Mechanistic

412

64

Teleological

309

170

CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT 2

The purpose of the second experiment is to identify systematic differences in the
mediating ideas underlying causal relations in mechanistic and teleological explanations.
Specifically, the mediating ideas for these causal relations are hypothesized to differ between
explanatory schemas in the role of the phenomenon of interest. Mediating ideas for causal
relations in mechanistic explanations are predicted to connect the events in the phenomenon’s
causal history as the antecedent to the phenomenon. For example, in the mechanistic explanation
“Skin becomes tan because when it is in the sun, the rays activate special cells that produce a
brown pigment called melanin”, the mediating idea for understanding the causal relationship is
that melanin is what gives skin its tan appearance. In this explanation, melanin production is the
antecedent and the phenomenon being explained (the tan) is the consequent. However, in a
teleological explanation, the phenomenon of interest enables the account provided as the
explanation. In a teleological explanation for tan skin such as “Skin becomes tan because
damage from dangerous UV rays may be prevented”, the mediating idea is that tans protect the
skin from dangerous UV rays. In this explanation, the phenomenon in question is the antecedent
to the protective effect. In summary, it is hypothesized that the mediating ideas needed to
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understand causal statements in mechanistic and teleological explanations will differ in terms of
whether the central phenomenon is the antecedent or the consequent in the proposition.
Mediating ideas for mechanistic explanations were predicted to feature the phenomenon as a
consequent. Mediating ideas for teleological explanations were predicted to feature the
phenomenon as an antecedent.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited using the online data collection platform Mechanical Turk.
The job description explained to prospective participants that they would read sentences about
science and select the idea that must be true in order for the explanation to be true. The job was
estimated to take less than thirty minutes and paid 30 cents per participant. Participants were
required to be of legal age to consent to participate (age 18 or above). There were no other
qualifying criteria to participate in this study. Participant data were not analyzed if the task was
abandoned mid-task, or if the participant attempted to submit multiple entries. This left data from
56 participants remaining in the analysis. The average age of participants was 34, with ages
ranging from 22-74. There were 24 females and 32 males. The majority of participants spoke
English as their first language and spoke English most frequently. However, three participants
reported Malayalam and two participants reported Tamil as most frequently spoken languages.
Materials
Both experiment two and three presented revised materials from studies 1A and 1B.
Explanations were simplified to ensure they represented a single causal proposition to limit other
inferences that could accompany longer texts. To simplify text, extraneous elaborations and
anaphoric referents were removed. Topics that could not be further simplified were replaced with
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alternative topics (see Appendix B). Mechanistic and teleological versions of each explanation
were counterbalanced across two versions for the second experiment. No filler items were
included in this task.
In this study, participants were tasked with selecting mediating ideas for explanatory
sentences. The options for mediating ideas were manipulated to place the phenomenon in the
position of antecedent or consequent. The position of antecedent or consequent was manipulated
by whether the phenomenon of interest was the subject or the object in the mediating idea. When
the phenomenon is the consequent, it is the object of the mediating idea (i.e. “UV rays make skin
tan”). When the phenomenon is the antecedent, it is the subject of the mediating idea (i.e. “tan
protects skin”). The approach for producing options for mediating ideas was informed by Singer,
Harkness and Stewart’s (1997) method of identifying mediating propositions for their causal
scientific texts. When Singer, Harkness, and Stewart (1997) normed mediating ideas for causal
sentences for their study, four expert responders were instructed to identify an idea which gave
rise to the phenomenon in the original sentence, and a propositional analysis identified common
propositions, which were used to construct the mediating sentences probed in the task (Singer,
Harkness, & Stewart, 1997). In this study, propositional analysis was instead used to guide the
construction of options for mediating ideas, and participants were instructed to select among the
options which of those options was necessary to make sense of the causal sentences.
Three types of mediating ideas were constructed for both mechanistic and teleological
versions of items. Using Bovair and Kieras’ (1981) article on propositional analysis as a guide,
these options were constructed so that there was a subject option, where the phenomenon of
interest was in the position of the logical subject, and an object option where the phenomenon of
interest was in the position of the logical object. A third elaborative option listed an additional
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detail about the topic of the explanation. Table 5 provides an example of each of these mediating
idea options for the teleological explanation for skin becoming tan, including the subject option
(“tan protects skin”), the object option (“UV rays make skin tan”), and the elaborative option
(“tan makes skin darker”). See Appendix C for full materials.
Table 5
Options for Mediating Ideas for Target Sentences
Target Sentence:
Skin becomes tan because damage from dangerous UV rays may be prevented.
Subject Option

Tan protects skin.

Object Option

UV rays make skin tan.

Elaborative Option

Tan makes skin darker.

Procedure
Upon selecting the job, participants received a link to a Qualtrics survey that presented an
informed consent page with an overview of the task and information about participation. Consent
was provided electronically by checking a box to indicate agreement to participate at the bottom
of the page. The next page presented the instructions for the task, and provide several examples
of the instructions applied to sample texts (see Table 6 for instructions). Participants were
instructed to read each explanation carefully and then selected from three options the single
sentence that must be true in order for the explanation to be true. After the first description of
instructions, participants received two examples of explanatory statements, and the mediating
idea that must be true in order for the explanation to be true. The first example featured a
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mechanistic explanation, and the second featured a teleological explanation. After reading these
examples, participants began the task. Explanations were presented one at a time in random
order. At the end of the survey, participants answered the same demographic questions about
their age, gender, first spoken language, and most frequently spoken language from study 1A and
1B. The end of the survey provided each participant a unique code they typed into the job
window on Mechanical Turk to receive credit for the survey.

Table 6
Experiment 2 Instructions with Examples

Introduction In this task you will read several sentence-long explanations for a variety of
scientific phenomena. Each sentence has a multiple choice selection of
additional information about that phenomenon. Your goal is to read each
sentence carefully and select the idea that must be true in order for the
explanation to make sense.
Example 1.

Imagine that you read this explanation for the good feeling we tend to get after
an intense workout:
“Exercising makes us feel good because it produces endorphins, which act on
the pleasure center of the brain.”
In order to understand this explanation, we need to make the connection
between the pleasure center of the brain and the result of a good feeling. So the
explanation above can only be true if acting on the pleasure center causes a
good feeling.
Just like in this example, your task will be to read multiple ideas about the
phenomenon and identify the one that must be true in order for the explanation
to make sense. In the case of the explanation above, it’s the idea that “acting on
the brain’s pleasure center makes us feel good.”

(Continued on following page)
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Table 6. Continued.
Example 2.

Now let’s imagine that you read this explanation for why baby deer have
spotted coats:
“Baby deer have spotted coats because predators are less likely to notice an
animal that has multiple colors on the forest floor.”
In order to understand this explanation, we would need to make the connection
between being less likely to be noticed, and having a spotted coat. The
explanation can only be true if having a spotted coat is harder to notice in the
forest.

Instructions

For each explanation you read, you will see three possible statements. One of
those statements must be true in order for the explanation to make sense. The
other two statements may also be true, but they do not NEED to be true in order
for the explanation to make sense.

Results and Discussion
The mediating idea for mechanistic explanations was predicted to follow the form of the
object option, in which the phenomenon was the object of the mediating idea. Therefore, the
selection of the option was expected to vary systematically with explanation type. A 2X3 chi
square analysis was performed to test the dependency of selecting each of the mediating idea
options on explanation schema. Option selection was dependent on explanatory schema, with a
higher frequency of selecting object options for mechanistic explanations and higher frequency
of selection subject options for teleological explanations, as predicted, c (2, 896) = 90.37,
2

p<0.05. The counts for each option selected in each explanation type are presented in Table 7.

39
Table 7.
Mediating Idea Selection for Mechanistic and Teleological Explanations

Explanation Type

Object Option

Subject Option

Elaborative Option

Mechanistic

245

124

79

Teleological

119

257

72

These findings are consistent with the hypothesized differences between mediating ideas
linking causal relations in mechanistic and teleological explanations. Mediating ideas selected
for mechanistic explanations were most frequently those in which the phenomenon occupied a
consequent role as the object of the proposition. Alternatively, mediating ideas selected for
teleological explanations were most frequently those in which the phenomenon was in an
antecedent role as the subject of the proposition. The difference between these mediating ideas
demonstrates the difference in the type of relationship necessary for understanding causal and
enabling relations found in these explanation types. While the current counts reported in this
analysis reveal a higher selection of mediating ideas consistent with hypothesized mediating
ideas for mechanistic and teleological explanations, the rate of selection of this option was
underwhelming. Both unrelated elaborative options and alternative options were selected for
both mechanistic and teleological explanations. For instance, selection of subject options for
mechanistic explanations occurred 124 times. This is particularly alarming for mechanistic
options, in which the subject option is a complete reversal of the causal order presented by the
explanations (for example, the idea that increased heartrate causes distress, or that scabs form
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collagen). Overall, this appears to be a difficult task, and recognizing the correct mediating idea
is not obvious to many readers which may account for relatively low rates for the majority
selection of mediating idea for mechanistic and teleological explanations. A limitation of the
sample reported here is that 50% of the sample had accuracy that was at or below 50%. A
reanalysis of data from participants with accuracy over 50% resulted in a substantial rise in the
proportion of the corresponding mediating ideas. The average selection of the object option for
mechanistic explanations rose from 0.55 to 0.75, and average selection of subject option for
teleological explanations rose from 0.57 to 0.81. The proportion of scores under 50% accuracy
may suggest that the task is was difficult for many of the participants. However, the overall
higher frequency of selecting object options for mechanistic explanations and subject options for
teleological explanations points to a systematic difference in the way propositions in
explanations need to be connected for each explanation type in order for them to be coherent.
The purpose of experiment three was to determine to what extent the online generation of
mediating ideas associated with different explanation types were influenced by reading
“because”.

CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENT 3

Experiment three investigates the extent of the role that “because” has in generating
mediating ideas needed to understand mechanistic and teleological explanations. Singer and
O’Connell (2003) found that the inclusion of “because” in expository texts that presented
mechanistic explanations resulted in faster verification of the mediating idea, suggesting that
readers were more likely to generate causal bridging inference consistent with mechanistic
explanations online when “because” was included in the sentence. This study extends this
finding to test whether including “because” has a similar effect on the generation of causal
bridging inferences for teleological explanations. Causal inference generation and the influence
of “because” has not been compared between these two explanatory schemas.
To review, this study tests two hypothesized accounts for the role of “because” in the
generation of causal bridging inferences in mechanistic and teleological explanations – the causal
dominance hypothesis, and the explanatory dominance hypothesis. These models differ in terms
of which schematic information guides causal inference generation when reading “because”.
According to the causal dominance hypothesis, “because” facilitates inferences necessary for
understanding cause-consequence relations in mechanistic explanations, but disrupts inference
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generation for understanding enabling relations in teleological explanations. In the explanatory
dominance hypothesis, “because” facilitates inferences needed for causal coherence relations in
both types of explanations, as it elicits a general causal schema that is further specified by the
context.
The experimental paradigm for testing these hypotheses is the same paradigm used to test
Singer’s proposed model for validating causal bridging inferences (Singer 1993; Singer,
Harkness & Stewart; 1997). In this paradigm, participants read a causal statement, and are
presented with a timed verification question that probes the mediating idea for that statement.
Both reading time of the causal statement, and verification time of the mediating inference are
analyzed to determine whether inference generation occurs during causal sentence reading.
Reading time is expected to be longer for sentences that require inference generation for
comprehension. The response time to the mediating idea is used as a measure of the availability
of that idea. Faster response times to the mediating idea suggest higher availability after having
read the causal statement, which suggests the inference was generated prior to answering the
question. To determine whether causal inference generation occurs online, both reading times for
the causal sentence and verification times for the mediating idea are compared between two
versions of a text. An explicit version of the text states the mediating idea in the text itself.
Reading the explicit text provides a baseline for verification of the mediating idea, because the
reader does not need to generate it for it to have a higher level of availability in memory. The
implicit text does not state the mediating idea. If participants fail to construct the mediating idea
online, this should be revealed in slower verification of the mediating idea compared to the
explicit text.
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Given this experimental paradigm, the causal dominance hypothesis predicts that
verification times for mediating inferences will be faster for mechanistic explanations than for
teleological explanations (see Figure 1). According to this hypothesis, reading “because”
activates a cause-consequence schema, which guides inference generation consistent with the
mediating ideas necessary for mechanistic explanations. Therefore, reading time for causal
sentences in mechanistic explanations are predicted to be longer if they contain “because”
compared to if they do not, which is reflective of ongoing inference generation (see Figure 2).
Conversely, the time taken to verify the mediating idea for mechanistic explanations is expected
to be shorter for explanations with “because” than those separated into two sentences. However,
the activation of the cause-consequence schema is predicted to disrupt the processing of
teleological explanations, because this schema guides an inference that conflicts with the
inference required for understanding enabling relationships. Therefore, the reader must activate a
new schema consistent with the causal relation, and this guides the generation of a new
inference. The production of a conflicting inference is predicted to result in longer reading times
for the teleological explanations containing “because”. Furthermore, the activation of the
appropriate schema and generation of the new inference is predicted to result in prolonged
verification times for teleological explanations containing “because”.
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Mechanistic

Teleological

Mechanistic

Explicit

Teleological

Implicit
Because

No Because

Figure 1. Predicted verification times for mediating ideas for the causal dominance hypothesis.
Alternatively, the explanatory dominance hypothesis predicts that processing of both
explanations, and therefore verification of mediating inferences, will be similar across
mechanistic and teleological explanations (see Figure 3). In this hypothesis, reading “because”
activates the schema for a non-specific causal relation , the specifics of which are constructed by
the reader through the context of the explanation. Understanding the context elicits a more
specific schema for the causal relation at hand, and this guides the required inference for
coherence. This hypothesis predicts longer reading times for causal sentences for both containing
“because”, due to ongoing inference generation (see Figure 2). However, contrary to the causal
dominance hypothesis, “because” is predicted to facilitate the generation of the inference needed
to understand both explanatory contexts, resulting in shorter verification times for both
mechanistic and teleological explanations when “because” is present. This prediction is
consistent with the verification time patterns hypothesized and confirmed in studies on the
validation of causal bridging inferences (Singer et al., 1993; Singer et al., 2003).
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No Because

Figure 2. Predicted reading times for causal target sentences for both causal dominance and
explanatory dominance hypotheses.

Mechanistic
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Teleological

Implicit
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No Because

Figure 3. Predicted verification times for mediating ideas for the explanatory dominance
hypothesis.
Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty-six participants from Northern Illinois University were
recruited through volunteers from various Psychology courses, flyers posted around campus, and
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through the introductory psychology course. Participants were entered into a drawing to win a
25-dollar cash prize. Ages of participants ranged from 18-45. There were 37 male and 89 female
participants. The majority of participants reported English as their most frequently spoken
language, although three reported Chinese, three reported Spanish, and one reported German as
most frequently spoken.
Materials
The materials for this study presented the explanations from the second experiment as
target sentences embedded in longer texts. As in experiment two, target sentences were
manipulated by explanation type (mechanistic or teleological), whether they were presented in
implicit or explicit texts, and whether the parts of the explanation were linked by “because” or
presented as separate sentences (see Table 8). Verification questions were worded to have a
similar number of syllables across mechanistic and teleological versions of each topic. As in
Singer and O’Connell (2003), these questions contained synonyms of verbs from the mediating
ideas presented in explicit text versions. Following the procedure of Singer and O’Connell
(2003), 12 teleological and mechanistic fillers with the same causal structure presented
information about additional biological phenomena. Filler verification questions for these items
did not probe a causal mediating inference, and instead queried a statement that reversed the
order of cause and effect for both types (for which the answer was “no”).
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Table 8
Sample Experimental Text with Target Sentence and Mediating Idea
Introductory
Sentence

During the summer, we may find that our skin changes color the more
time we spend outside.

Mediating Idea
(Explicit)

Melanin makes our skin darker.

Target Sentence

Skin becomes tan (because) sun rays activate the production of melanin.

Closing Sentence

The use of sunscreen can reduce the process of tanning.

Procedure
Participants completed the task in a computer lab. Using the same procedure as Singer
and O’Connell (2003), texts were presented one sentence at a time using e-prime 2.0 (Schneider,
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2007), and accumulated on the screen to reveal the entire passage.
Participants were instructed to read each sentence at their own pace, and press the spacebar to
reveal the next sentence once the current sentence had been understood. After the closing
sentence of each text, participants received two speeded verification questions, the critical
question that probed the mediating idea, and a question that probed elaborative information.
Following the procedure from Singer and O’Connell (2003), each question was signaled with a
blank screen followed by an asterisk at the center of the screen for 250 ms before the verification
question appeared. Reading times for the target sentences and answer times for the question
verification task were measured as dependent variables.
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Results and Discussion
Participant data were removed from the analysis in cases of failure to follow directions
for hand placement on the keyboard throughout the task. Due to technical issues, four of the
eight counterbalanced item lists needed to be collected anew in a second phase of data collection,
and 30 of the corresponding participants from the original data collection phase were not
included in the analysis. Participant data were also excluded from analyses in cases where
directions for finger placement was not followed, or due to interruptions to the experimental
procedure. The final analysis involved data from 61 participants.
Only items with correct responses to critical verification questions were analyzed (84%
of responses included in the described analysis were accurate). Multilevel modeling was selected
as the analysis strategy because of its ability to handle missing data for incorrect responses, in
addition to controlling for participant and item variance. In preparing data for a mixed effects
modeling analysis, a cutoff point was set at 65% accuracy. This ensured that more responses
were analyzed than left as missing data for each participant, and that responses to verification
questions were not a random selection of “yes” or “no”.
Additionally, responses were only analyzed if they were within a response time window
of 1500 milliseconds (1.5 seconds) and 10000 milliseconds (10 seconds). The lowest response
time was set based on the lowest reasonable time needed to comprehend a verification question.
It is unlikely that a response time lower than 1.5 seconds would reflect the additional processing
necessary to make a decision about the truth of the question after it was comprehended,
indicating a response that was inconsistent with the task to answer “yes” or “no”. The longest
response time was selected based on a cutoff point established in methodology from Singer and
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O’Connell (2003), where the next line of text was presented automatically after ten seconds
during the self-paced reading task.
The first analysis was conducted on verification times per syllable in milliseconds for
each condition. The average milliseconds per syllable for verification questions in each condition
are presented in Figure 4. Analyses were conducted on verification time per syllable in order to
compensate for discrepancies in the lengths of verification questions among mechanistic and
teleological versions of items. Average response times for correct responses for each condition
are presented in Figure 4. Average verification times per syllable were not normally distributed,
with a skewness of 1.75 (SE=0.93). Therefore, data were transformed using a natural log
transformation to improve normality, and skew was reduced in log transformed data, at 0.55
(SE=0.93). Analyses were conducted on log transformed data.
Linear mixed effects modeling was used to control for subject and item variance while
testing the effect of connective on verification times for implicit versions of mechanistic and
teleological explanations. This was achieved by creating a baseline model, and comparing
subsequent models with random and fixed variables added one at a time, comparing the model fit
between each new model to the prior model. Item and participant variance were added as random
factors, and the phase in which data was collected was added as a fixed factor to account for any
variance that may have been due to recollecting four of the item lists. Manipulated variables
including text explicitness, connective, and explanation type, and interactions between these
variables were added as fixed factors. According to this procedure, the model that best fit the
per-syllable verification response times included participants and items as random effects and
collection phase and text explicitness as fixed factors. This model revealed a significant random
effect of topic Z=2.55, p<0.01, and significant random effect of participant Z=3.90, p<0.01. The
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collection phase variable did not account for any significant portion for variance according to
this model, suggesting no systemic differences in data between data collection phases.
Furthermore, a significant effect of text explicitness provided a successful manipulation check in
that participants were faster to answer verification questions when the mediating ideas they
tested were explicitly stated in the text (M=365.17 SD=170.85) than in implicit versions where
readers needed to generate the mediating idea themselves (M=403.82, SD=215.32),
F(1,624.80)=10.88, p<0.01.
Subsequent models testing the inclusion of “because” on verification times for both
mechanistic and teleological explanations did not account for any additional variance. While the
connective did not have a statistically significant effect on verification times of mediating ideas,
the descriptive means for each condition revealed a pattern that is consistent with the causal
dominance hypothesis, which predicted that reading “because” would facilitate the generation of
mediating inferences for cause-effect relations in mechanistic explanations, but not enabling
relations in teleological explanations. According to the per-syllable verification time means,
there appeared to be an advantage in response time for verifying mediating ideas when “because”
was present in the target sentence for implicit versions of mechanistic explanations. The response
times for verification questions with target sentences linked by “because” (M=393.77, SD178.59)
were faster than response times for verification questions for mediating ideas without “because”
(M=442.86, SD=234.72). The opposite pattern appeared to characterize implicit versions of
teleological explanations for target sentences linked with “because” (M=407.01 SD=251.18)
compared to target sentences without “because” (M=370.62, SD=186.1). The number of items
might not have lent sufficient power for finding a significant three-way interaction. Running this
study with a larger selection of items may reveal that these patterns reflect a statistically
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significant advantage for inferring mediating ideas for mechanistic explanations over teleological
explanations when reading “because”. This is speculation as the current analysis stands.
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No Because

Figure 4. Per-syllable verification times in milliseconds for explicit and implicit texts.
Reading times for target sentences were also analyzed for items in which verification
questions resulted in a correct response. As with verification times, reading time was calculated
to reflect average milliseconds per syllable. Means for reading times in each condition are
depicted in Figure 5. Reading time was positively skewed at 1 (SE=0.09), and performing a
natural log transformation led to reduced skewness of -0.28 (SE=0.09). Analyses were performed
on transformed reading times.
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Figure 5. Per-syllable reading times in milliseconds for target sentences in explicit and implicit
texts.
Linear mixed effects modeling was used to control for subject and item variance while
testing the effect of connective on target sentence reading time in different explanation types. A
model controlling for item variance Z=2.58, p<0.05 and participant variance, Z=4.74, p<0.01 as
random effects, and testing collection phase, coherence, and connective as fixed factors provided
the best fit for reading time data. This model revealed that the inclusion of “because” resulted in
reduced average reading time per syllable (M=351.28, SD=203.87), compared to explanations
that did not include “because” (M=391.35, SD=339.25). Models adding interactions among
connective and other variables did not account for additional variance. Contrary to the prediction
outline for both hypotheses, reading times for mechanistic and teleological explanations
including “because” and were both faster as a result of the presence of “because”. This suggests
the inclusion of “because” facilitated the reading of causal coherence relations in mechanistic
and teleological explanations to a similar degree, which is somewhat consistent with the
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explanatory dominance hypothesis. However, faster reading time for these sentence conflicts
with the prediction that target sentences with “because” will be longer to accommodate online
inference generation. This also conflicts with prior findings that target sentences with “because”
tend to be longer than the target sentences without (Singer & O’Connell, 2003).
Overall, the lack of statistical significance for any affect involving “because” in
verification times, combined with faster reading times for target causal sentences including
“because” are not consistent with prior findings that causal connectives facilitate causal inference
generation (Singer & O’Connell, 2003). The current analysis revealed that the inclusion of the
mediating idea in the text (i.e. the explicit version of the text) decreased response time to
verifying the mediating idea. This was a successful manipulation check that the explicit text
serves as a baseline by which to compare other conditions to determine if inference of the
mediating idea occurred without explicit reference to it. However, the composition of the target
sentence (whether it was connected by “because” or divided into two sentences) did not appear
to facilitate the verification of mediating ideas in either mechanistic or teleological explanations.
This did not replicate the findings of Singer and O’Connell (2003), who found the inclusion of
“because” facilitated verification times for mediating ideas for causal texts about science.
That “because” did not appear to significantly affect the facilitation of the mediating idea
differentially between explanations is most consistent with an explanatory dominance hypothesis
in the sense that “because” had comparable effects when read in both explanation types.
However, the altogether lack of facilitation “because” had on texts cannot be said to support this
hypothesis, as statistical power may not have been high enough to pick up on differences
between the “because” and “no because” conditions. If the descriptive differences among
verification times indicate a real verification time advantage for target sentences with “because”
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in mechanistic explanations, but inhibits verification for the teleological explanations, this is
more consistent with the causal dominance account. Given the current analysis, the explanatory
dominance hypothesis is the best account for the current statistical outcome.

CHAPTER 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of the causal connective “because”
for conveying causal coherence relations in mechanistic and teleological explanations. Each of
these explanation types provide distinct causal coherence relations; cause-effect in mechanistic
explanations, and enabling in teleological explanations. The current study documented three
things about the role of “because” in different scientific explanations. First, it evaluated the
extent to which readers accepted the use of “because” to convey both types of causal relations.
Second, it documented the mediating ideas necessary for understanding causal relations in each
explanation type. Third, it illustrated how causal inference generation for those explanation types
was influenced by the causal connective “because”. Specifically, the third experiment tested
competing hypotheses about whether schematic information guiding inference generation came
from a specific meaning of “because”, or was constructed from the explanatory context.
This study found a trend in willingness to use “because” to express both cause-effect
relations in mechanistic explanations, and enabling relations in teleological explanations. It was
hypothesized that “because” would be an acceptable connective for both cause-consequence and
enabling relations, though each presents a unique relationship between propositions. This was
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supported by the results of studies 1A and 1B. In study 1A, participants selected “because” at a
higher frequency than non-causal options such as “and” and “but”, supporting the perception of a
causal relation for both explanation types. This frequency was higher for mechanistic than
teleological explanations, but the selection of “because” for both explanation types outweighed
the other sensible option of selecting an additive connective. Furthermore, while readers
accepted the use of “because” to convey enabling relations in teleological explanations, study 1B
found that readers demonstrated a preference for “so that” to convey enabling relations in
teleological explanations, and “because” for cause-consequence relations in mechanistic
explanations. The selection of “so that” and “because” were closer in proportion to one another,
suggesting that these connectives are somewhat interchangeable. Taken together, this indicates
both that participants recognize a difference in the coherence relations that characterize
mechanistic and teleological explanations, and select “because” as a functional connective for
both scenarios, when a more specific connective (like “so that”) is unavailable (and indeed even
for cases when it is made available). The acknowledgment of unique causal relationships
between explanation types through the selection of “so that” for enabling relations and “because”
for cause-consequence relations, together with the selection of “because” for both explanation
types, supports the idea that “because” is suitable to some extent for signaling more than one
type of causal coherence relation in scientific explanations.
The second experiment established that cause-effect and enabling relations differed from
one another on the basis of the mediating ideas required to make sense of them. Experiment two
presented readers with a selection of propositions that must be true in order for the causal
relation to make sense. The mediating ideas for mechanistic and teleological explanations were
hypothesized to differ with regards to the relationship between the phenomenon of interest and
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the account of the phenomenon. It was hypothesized that mediating ideas would differ primarily
by whether the phenomenon of interest was in the position of antecedent or consequent for
mechanistic and teleological explanations. The results of study two confirmed that mediating
ideas most frequently identified for mechanistic explanations situated the phenomenon of interest
in the position of the consequent, as the object of the proposition, while mediating ideas most
frequently selected for teleological explanations situated the phenomenon of interest in the
position of antecedent, as the subject of the proposition. The difference in mediating ideas for
different causal coherence relations suggests that the way propositions are combined during
comprehension is demonstrably different depending on the type of causal coherence relation,
even when the causal connective is the same.
Up to this point, the current work has established that “because” is an acceptable
connective for conveying both cause-effect relations in mechanistic explanations and enabling
relations in teleological explanations (study 1A and 1B), and that those two relations differ in
way they connect propositions (study 2). The final experiment evaluated the role of “because” in
the generation of causal bridging inferences when making sense of those relations. This
experiment tested two hypotheses, the causal dominance hypothesis where inferences are guided
by a causal schema elicited by “because”, and the explanatory dominance hypothesis where
inferences are guided by the explanatory context. These hypotheses were compared by
examining the verification of mediating ideas for the implicit text versions of mechanistic and
teleological explanations that included “because” or not. When comparing verification times
among implicit text versions, means hint at a potential advantage in online inference generation
when “because” links the propositions of mechanistic explanations, but demonstrates the reverse
for “because” in teleological explanations (consistent with the causal dominance hypothesis).
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However, models that included a three-way interaction testing this comparison did not provide
significantly better model fit for the data reported here. Thus, the results of experiment three did
not demonstrate conclusive evidence that the mediating ideas required by causal relations for
either explanation types were facilitated by reading “because”.
A possible explanation for the results reported here is that the current study may be
underpowered, given the number of experimental items (2) in each condition, and after data
from participants with low accuracy were removed from analyses. Collecting data from a larger
sample with additional items is expected to yield the necessary power to reveal an interaction in
verification time means if one exists. Alternatively, the trend reported here may not reflect a
meaningful difference among conditions, in which case “because” appears to affect inference
generation uniformly across both explanation types. This is closer to the explanatory dominance
hypothesis, in that reading “because” does not facilitate one type of mediating idea over another,
but rather the context drives inference generation. However, a full adoption of the explanatory
dominance hypothesis is not warranted with these data, as that account suggests that “because”
would facilitate inference generation in both explanatory schemas. Instead, the current study
failed to find a facilitative effect of “because” on causal inference generation altogether.
Ultimately, the question of whether causal inference generation in different scientific
explanations is guided by the lexical meaning of the causal connective, or by a schema for that
explanatory context remains unclear. Given the current findings, “because” does not appear to
meaningfully assist the inferences of one causal relation over another – a finding that is not
consistent with conclusions of prior work using similar methods (Singer & O’Connell, 2003),
and conflicts more generally with work that has found evidence that reading “because” results in
increased likelihood of causal inference generation (Caron et al., 1988, Millis & Just, 1994). This
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could indicate a flexible, context-dependent interpretation of “because” among various types of
causal relationships, which is consistent with the finding that “because” and “so that” are both
acceptable selections for enabling relations. However, the failure to replicate the facilitative
effect of “because” on causal inference generation at all requires follow-up investigation with a
larger sample.
The extent to which connectives make coherence relations explicit varies depending on
the context in which they are used. On one end of the extreme, connectives signaling a relation
may be redundant when the connection is obvious based on prior knowledge. On the other end,
connectives can slow comprehension, distracting a reader by signaling a nonsense connection
(Millis & Just, 1994). When used to signal a relation in a context where that coherence relation is
not obvious, connectives can make inference generation faster (Caron et al., 1988) and even
elicit inference generation outright (Singer & O’Connell, 2003). The findings of the experiments
reported here illustrate the separation between coherence relations and the connectives that signal
them.
The varying effect of connectives on inference generation (i.e. making it faster or
eliciting the process altogether) leads to the open question of the role of a causal connective on
causal inference generation in the contexts of different forms of scientific explanation. The
pattern of verification times for causal mediating ideas in the third experiment suggests that
“because” may differentially affect causal inference generation in separate explanatory contexts.
In the causal dominance hypothesis, the prediction was that inference generation would be
directed by a cause-consequence schema elicited by “because”, as opposed to a schema activated
by the explanatory context. While this trend in verification times was non-significant, the pattern
suggests that “because” did not facilitate inferences needed to make sense of enabling relations
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in teleological explanations the way it seemed to facilitate inferences consistent with causeconsequence relations in mechanistic explanations.
The trend in verification times suggests reading “because” while processing explanations
seems to be useful if the explanation is mechanistic, but not if it is teleological. This pattern is
somewhat consistent with the findings of Singer et al. (1997) who used the same inference
verification task to compare two sets of scientific texts. One set conveyed primarily mechanistic
relationships, while the other conveyed more justification relationships. Although the presence of
a connective was not manipulated for this study, the verification times for materials featuring
justification relations were slower than for cause-consequence relations in the implicit text
versions. This may suggest that mediating ideas for cause-consequence relations are easier to
generate in comparison to the mediating ideas needed for other types of causal coherence
relations. As described in previous literature, teleological explanations have been documented as
intuitive ways of reasoning about phenomena (Kelemen, 1999). However, a study by Tamir and
Zohar (1991) demonstrated that when faced with the task of explaining their own teleological
reasoning, science students struggled to present reasons for plant and animal behavior that was
consistent with their initial teleological explanation. Therefore, while teleological explanations
may seem more intuitive, as task that involves verifying the underlying connections in causal
relations may overall be easier for mechanistic explanations.
Despite an interesting trend in verification times reported for study 3, the analysis did not
reveal a significant effect of including “because” on verifying causal inferences. Thus, an
alternate interpretation of the current findings is that of a flexible context-dependent
interpretation of the connective’s role in inference generation. This is consistent with a model of
understanding connectives put forth by Caron (1997). One understanding of connectives may be
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that each has a discrete lexical meaning to be decoded, and applied to the sentence with
additional inferential processes required to repair the relation and arrive at the correct
interpretation. This model is represented by the causal dominance hypothesis outlined in the third
experiment. The consequence this account has for inferential processing when reading “because”
is that the connective would establish a relationship that would require additional reparative
processes to establish coherence.
However, Caron (1997) considers the process of decoding a connective’s specific lexical
meaning and then making additional knowledge-based inferences to achieve coherence seems
unlikely, considering the speed and ease at which we understand relations that would require
such reparative processes. Instead, Caron’s (1997) proposed model of understanding connectives
is that each elicits a “meaning schema” on the given context. Thus, rather than intrinsic
meanings, Caron (1997) uses a tool metaphor to describe the potential interpretations of
connectives across various contexts. In this model, a connective’s “meaning schema” provides
more general processing instructions that could result in multiple interpretative outcomes. The
consequence this has for inferential processes that occur when reading “because” is that the
initial inference would be context driven, and therefore different for various causal relations,
rather than requiring additional inferences to attain coherence. This account is more aligned with
the explanatory dominance hypothesis outlined in the third experiment, and consequently has
more support based on the lack of facilitative differences found for “because” for different
coherence relation types. Future investigations, such as a sufficiently powered replication of
study three, could move the field toward resolving these competing accounts.
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APPENDIX A
TELEOLOGICAL AND MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS FOR BIOLOGY TOPICS IN
EXPERIMENTS 1A & 1B
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Materials for Experiments 1A and 1B
Topic

Teleological

Mechanistic

Scab

Scabs form over a wound because
they block the germs we encounter
from entering the body through
open blood vessels.

Scabs form over a wound because
collagen flows into the bloodstream
when blood vessels break and makes
blood stickier.

Sneeze

Dust in the air makes us sneeze
because it prevents dust and other
debris from building up and
running down the back of the
throat into the stomach.

Dust in the air makes us sneeze
because it triggers the release of
histamines, which activate nerve cells
in the nose that trigger a reflex in the
brain.

Fevers

We get fevers because it makes the
body a more difficult environment
for the infection to survive and
continue to spread.

We get fevers because the immune
system detects an infection and
signals the brain to raise the body’s
internal temperature setpoint.

Salivate

The smell of delicious food makes
us salivate because it introduces
enzymes that help make it easier to
break down the food.

The smell of delicious food makes us
salivate because it triggers signals in
the brain that activate salivary glands
to begin excretion.

Burp

Carbonated drinks make us burp
because space in the digestive
system is freed to accommodate
more food.

Carbonated drinks make us burp
because carbon in the stomach
stretches the throat leading the
muscles to relax.

Hot Surface

Touching a hot surface makes us
involuntarily pull our hand back
because it prevents damage to the
body that is likely to occur from
exposure to extreme heat.

Touching a hot surface makes us
involuntarily pull our hand back
because it activates receptors that
message the spinal cord, which sends
an impulse to the back of the hand.

Sweat

The body sweats when heated
because the body’s internal
temperature stays the same, which
is best for optimal organ function.

The body sweats when heated
because it detects an increase in body
temperature in the hypothalamus, and
sends a signal to the sweat glands.
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Tan

Skin becomes tan because it is
protected from damage that comes
from certain types of rays from the
sun, such as cancer-causing UV
rays.

Skin becomes tan because when it is
in the sun, the rays activate special
cells that produce a deep brown
pigment called melanin.

Light

Light keeps us awake because we
are most active for the best hours
for visual perception of our
surroundings.

Light keeps us awake because it
blocks the pineal gland from
producing the sleep hormone
melatonin.

Hibernation

Groundhogs hibernate because they
conserve energy when the outside
temperature is cold and food is
scarce.

Groundhogs hibernate because
fewer daylight hours trigger a
chemical in the blood that slows
metabolism and heartrate.

Shedding

Snakes shed their skin because a
new skin can accommodate their
larger sized body as they grow.

Snakes shed their skin because as
new skin forms, it stretches the old
skin until it breaks.

Camouflage

Maturing deer lose their white spots
because their coat can better blend
in against the tree trunks in the
surrounding forest.

Maturing deer lose their white spots
because as the baby coat falls out,
solid brown hair develops uniformly
across hair follicles.

Swarm

Wasps swarm intruders because the
queen and the vulnerable wasp
larva will be protected from any
damage caused by destructive
activity from another animal.

Wasps swarm intruders because
when the nest is disturbed, guard
wasps emit a pheromone detected
by nearby wasps, who fly toward
the disturbance.

Earwax

The ear secretes wax because it
prevents dust and debris from
entering the middle ear where it
could interfere with the eardrum.

The ear secretes wax because sweat
glands under the skin drain into ear
ducts and collect body oil and dead
skin cells.
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Body Orientation

We sense our body’s
orientation in space because it
helps us right ourselves when
necessary, such as when we
are underwater or have fallen
over.

We sense our body’s
orientation in space because
the inner ear contains small
stones of calcium salt that
shift in response to changes
in gravity.

Physical Activity

Physical activity increases
heartrate because active will
muscles get the additional
oxygen they need to sustain
the activity.

Physical activity increases
heartrate because it produces
heat detected by the
hypothalamus, which signals
more pulses to the heart.

APPENDIX B
TELEOLOGICAL AND MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS FOR BIOLOGY TOPICS IN
EXPERIMENTS 2 & 3
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Materials for Experiments 2 and 3
Topic

Teleological

Mechanistic

Scab

Scabs develop because germs are
kept from entering the body.

Scabs develop because collagen
flows into the bloodstream when
blood vessels break.

Sneeze

We sneeze because dust is removed
before the particles aggravate other
parts of the body.

We sneeze because irritants trigger
histamines that stimulate facial
motor nerves.

Fevers

We get fevers because the body
becomes too difficult an
environment for the infection to
survive.

We get fevers because the immune
system signals the brain to raise the
body's internal setpoint.

Salivate

The smell of delicious food makes
us salivate because a solution is
introduced that jumpstarts the
process of digestion.

The smell of delicious food makes
us salivate because odors trigger the
brain to stimulate glands in the
mouth.

Earwax

The ear secretes wax because debris
is prevented from reaching and
damaging the eardrum.

The ear secretes wax because sweat
and dead skin mix with oil in ear
ducts.

Fear

Fear increases heart rate because
Fear increases heart rate because
muscles are able to move faster with distress triggers the nervous system
more power.
to release adrenaline.

Fat

We store fat because the body has a
guaranteed source of energy to use
when it is needed.

We store fat because digesting food
triggers the pancreas to release
insulin, which opens cells to absorb
the fat.
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Burp

We burp because the digestive
system is able to accommodate and
process more food.

We burp because excess stomach
gas triggers an abdominal
contraction, which relaxes a
stomach-throat barrier.

Hot Surface

We automatically pull our hand
away from hot surfaces because the
skin is protected from extreme
burns.

We automatically pull our hand
away from hot surfaces because
pain fibers signal the spinal nerves.

Sweat

The body sweats because organ
function is best when the internal
body temperature remains the same.

The body sweats because increased
temperature is detected in the
hypothalamus, which signals certain
glands.

Tan

Skin becomes tan because damage
from dangerous UV rays may be
prevented.

Skin becomes tan because sun rays
activate the production of melanin.

Color Change

The octopus changes color because
predators have a difficult time
distinguishing the camouflaged
body from surrounding coral and
rocks.

The octopus changes color because
sacs of different pigments in skin
cells stretch over a larger surface
area of the cell.

Hibernation

Groundhogs hibernate because the
groundhog doesn't expend the
energy to maintain normal
functioning when food is scarce.

Groundhogs hibernate because a
reduction in daylight hours triggers
a chemical to be released into the
blood.

Shedding

Snakes shed their skin because the
snake increases their chances of
survival with a larger body.

Snakes shed their skin because an
increasing body size stretches the
old skin.
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Antlers

Deer lose their antlers every year
because each year the antlers grow
back larger, which cues the
reproductive viability of the deer.

Deer lose their antlers every year
because shorter days in fall trigger
hormones that weaken the base of
the antler.

Swarm

Wasps swarm intruders because the
wasp larva and queen will be
protected from damage caused by
another animal.

Wasps swarm intruders because
wasps release a pheromone if the
nest is disturbed that alerts adjacent
wasps.

APPENDIX C
MECHANISTIC AND TELEOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS WITH MEDIATING IDEA
OPTIONS

Selections for Mediating Ideas for Mechanistic and Teleological Explanations
Explanation Type

Mediating Idea Option
Logical
Logical Subject
Object
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Elaborative

Mechanistic

Scabs develop
because collagen
flows into the
bloodstream when
blood vessels break.

Scabs produce
collagen.

Collagen
forms scabs.

Scabs cover
wounds.

Teleological

Scabs develop
because germs are
kept from entering
the body.

Scabs block
germs.

Germs form
scabs.

Scabs cover
wounds.

Mechanistic

We sneeze because
irritants trigger
Sneezes trigger
histamines that
histamines.
stimulate facial motor
nerves.

Facial motor
nerves
activate
sneezes.

Irritants are
airborne.

Teleological

We sneeze because
dust is removed
before the particles
aggravate other parts
of the body.

Sneezes expel
dust.

Aggravation
causes
sneezing.

Irritants are
airborne.

Mechanistic

We get fevers
because the immune
system signals the
brain to raise the
body's internal
setpoint.

Fevers activate
the immune
system.

Fevers
Brain controls
indicate
fevers.
illness.
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Teleological

We get fevers
because the body
becomes too difficult
an environment for
the infection to
survive.

Fevers kill
infections.

Survival
causes fevers.

Fevers
indicate
illness.

Mechanistic

The smell of
delicious food makes
us salivate because
odors trigger the
brain to stimulate
glands in the mouth.

Glands trigger
saliva.

Glands expel
saliva.

We crave
delicious
food.

Teleological

The smell of
delicious food makes
us salivate because a
solution is introduced
that jumpstarts the
process of digestion.

Saliva dissolves
food.

Digestion
triggers
saliva.

We crave
delicious
food.

Wax produces
oil.

Oils become
wax.

Wax clogs
ears.

Wax traps
debris.

Debris creates Wax clogs
wax.
ears.

Mechanistic

Teleological

The ear secretes wax
because sweat and
dead skin mix with
oil in ear ducts.

The ear secretes wax
because debris is
prevented from
reaching and
damaging the
eardrum.
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Mechanistic

Fear increases heart
rate because distress
triggers the nervous
system to release
adrenaline.

Heart rate
creates distress.

Teleological

Fear increases heart
rate because muscles
are able to move
faster with more
power.

Muscles
The heart powers
power the
muscles.
heart.

Mechanistic

We store fat because
digesting food
triggers the pancreas
to release insulin,
which opens cells to
absorb the fat.

Fat stores
insulin.

Insulin
controls fat
storage.

Food
contains fat.

Teleological

We store fat because
the body has a
guaranteed source of
energy to use when it
is needed.

Stored fat
provides energy.

Energy
creates fat.

Food
contains fat.

Mechanistic

We burp because
excess stomach gas
triggers an abdominal
contraction, which
relaxes a stomachthroat barrier.

Burp relaxes
stomach barrier.

Escaping gas
causes burp.

Burp
relieves
pressure.

Adrenaline
increases
heart rate.

Fear
initiates
fight or
flight.

Fear
initiates
fight or
flight.
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Teleological

We burp because the
digestive system is
able to accommodate
and process more
food.

Burping frees
digestive space.

Processing
food leads to
burping.

Burping
relieves
pressure.

Mechanistic

We automatically
pull our hand away
from hot surfaces
because pain fibers
signal the spinal
nerves.

Retraction
activates spinal
nerves.

Spinal nerves
control hand
motion.

Hot surfaces
cook things.

Teleological

We automatically
pull our hand away
from hot surfaces
because the skin is
protected from
extreme burns.

Retracting our
hand prevents
burns.

Burns make
us retract our
hand.

Hot surfaces
cook things.

Mechanistic

The body sweats
because increased
temperature is
detected in the
hypothalamus, which
signals certain
glands.

Sweat activates
the
hypothalamus.

Glands
release sweat.

Body
temperature
is stable.

Teleological

The body sweats
because organ
function is best when
the internal body
temperature remains
the same.

Sweating
maintains
temperature.

Organ
function
produces
sweat.

Body
temperature
is stable.
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Mechanistic

Skin becomes tan
because sun rays
activate the
production of
melanin.

Skin activates
melanin
production.

Melanin
makes skin
tan.

Tan makes
skin darker.

Teleological

Skin becomes tan
because damage from
dangerous UV rays
may be prevented.

Tan protects
skin.

UV rays
make skin
tan.

Tan makes
skin darker.

Mechanistic

The octopus changes
color because sacs of
different pigments in
skin cells stretch over
a larger surface area
of the cell.

Color change
stretches
pigment sacs.

Surface area
determines
skin color.

Octopi have
eight legs.

Teleological

The octopus changes
color because
predators have a
difficult time
distinguishing the
camouflaged body
from surrounding
coral and rocks.

Color change
provides
camouflage.

Camouflage
triggers color
change.

Octopi have
eight legs.

Mechanistic

Groundhogs
hibernate because a
reduction in daylight
hours triggers a
chemical to be
released into the
blood.

Blood
Hibernation
chemistry
triggers a
controls
chemical release.
hibernation.

Hibernation
occurs in
winter.
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Teleological

Groundhogs
hibernate because the
groundhog doesn't
expend the energy to
maintain normal
functioning when
food is scarce.

Hibernation
conserves
energy.

Food scarcity
triggers
hibernation.

Hibernation
occurs in
winter.

Mechanistic

Snakes shed their
skin because an
increasing body size
stretches the old skin.

Shedding
stretches skin.

Stretching
breaks skin.

Snakes hunt
for food.

Teleological

Snakes shed their
skin because the
snake increases their
chances of survival
with a larger body.

Shedding
supports
survival.

Survival
triggers
shedding.

Snakes hunt
for food.

Mechanistic

Deer lose their antlers
every year because
Shedding
shorter days in fall
changes
trigger hormones that
hormones.
weaken the base of
the antler.

Weakening
triggers
breakage.

Antlers are
used to
fight.

Teleological

Deer lose their antlers
every year because
each year the antlers
Antlers reflect
grow back larger,
viability.
which cues the
reproductive viability
of the deer.

Reproduction
generates
antlers.

Antlers are
used to
fight.
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Mechanistic

Wasps swarm
intruders because
wasps release a
Swarms alert
pheromone if the nest adjacent wasps.
is disturbed that alerts
adjacent wasps.

Alerted wasps Wasp stings
form swarms. hurt.

Teleological

Wasps swarm
intruders because the
wasp larva and queen
will be protected
from damage caused
by another animal.

Damage
initiates
swarms.

Swarms
discourage
intruders.

Wasp stings
hurt.

